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Abstract
In this comment, we show that the special attack [S.-J. Qin, F. Gao, Q.-Y. Wen, F.-C. Zhu, Opt. Commun. 281 (2008) 5472.], which
claims to be able to obtain all the transmitted secret message bit values of the protocol of the multiparty quantum secret sharing of
secure direct communication using single photons with random phase shift operations, fails. Furthermore, a class of similar attacks
are also shown to fail to extract the secrete message.
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In a recent paper, Qin et al. [1] pointed out that the HLLZ
protocol [2] is vulnerable to a special participant attack strategy
(hereafter called the QGWZ attack) where Alice’s secret mes-
sage can be extracted by any dishonest agent without any help
of the other agents. However, in this paper, we comment that
some errors may exist in the QGWZ attack and thus it fails to
attack HLLZ protocol successfully.
The six main stages of the HLLZ protocol are preparation
phase, encryption phase, the first detection, encoding phase,
recovery phase and the second detection[2]. In short, based
on the linear property of the quantum random phase shift op-
erations (RPSOs) or equivalently random single-qubit rotations
along the y-axis, the encryption, encoding and recovering phase
of this protocol can be expressed as the addition/subtraction of
the rotation angles on each photon (qubit) at different stages:
ˆU(θ j)
ˆU(3m jpi/2)
=⇒ ˆU(θ j + 3m jpi/2)
ˆU(−θ j)
=⇒ ˆU(3m jpi/2). (1)
Here ˆU(θ j) represents a rotation on photon j with θ j = θB j +
θC j + · · · + θZ j , and 3m jpi/2 is the rotation angle made by Alice
on the photon j according to the bit value m j = 0 or 1 of her se-
cret message m. The measurement action in the recovery phase
by the agent (say Zach), to which Alice sent the photons with
encoded message, reflects basically whether there is a rotation
of an angle 32pi on the photon (qubit) j or not. If there is, the bit
value of the message bit j is m j = 1; otherwise, m j = 0.
Grasping the main steps of the HLLZ protocol, the scenario
for an dishonest agent (say Charlie) in the QGWZ attack is to
entangle the transmitted photons with prepared ancilla photons
firstly, to escape from the detection secondly, and to attain the
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secret message without being discovered lastly [1]. However,
the errors that existed in the Ref. [1] will doom Charlie to fail
to extract the secret message even if he can escape from the
detection. The first typo in Ref. [1] is in the last sentence of
the first paragraph of step (E2) in the second column on page
5473. The correct sentence for that should read as “Then Char-
lie sends the fake sequence T to Alice.”. In other words, the
sequence that was sent out by Charlie is T rather than H stated
in Ref. [1]. But this typo is very minor as it is obvious from the
subsequent description in Ref. [1] that it is the T sequence that
was sent out.
The possible serious error is in the expression of Eq. (9)
of Ref. [1] which was derived from Eq. (7) of Ref. [1] by a
controlled-controlled-(−iσy) operation (referred to as CY oper-
ation in [1]) with photons H j and T j being the control qubits
and photon S j being the target qubit. The action of CY opera-
tion on computational basis states is given by CY |t〉|c1〉|c2〉 =
(−iσy)c1⊗c2|t〉|c1〉|c2〉, where c1 and c2 represent the control
qubits and t stands for the target qubit on which the −iσy op-
eration acts. So the correct expression for Eq. (9) of Ref. [1]
should read as
|Ψ03〉S jH jT j =
1
2 (cos θ|0〉 − sin θ|1〉)S j(|00〉 + |11〉 − |01〉 + |10〉)H jT j .
(2)
Comparing Eq. (2) above with Eq. (10) of Ref. [1], one can find
that the two H jT j photon states in those two equations are iden-
tical rather than orthogonal. The statement that the two states
of photons H jT j are orthogonal in Ref. [1] comes from compar-
ing the incorrect Eq. (9) of Ref. [1] with Eq. (10) of Ref. [1].
Therefore, Charlie cannot, by measuring photons H jT j, distin-
guish the state |Ψ03〉S jH jT j of the correct Eq. (2) from the state
|Ψ13〉S jH jT j of Eq. (10) of Ref. [1], and thus cannot extract Al-
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ice’s secret bit value in practice. As a result, the QGWZ attack
fails to extract Alice’s secret message bits from the HLLZ pro-
tocol.
The main idea of the QGWZ attack seems (i) to use an entan-
glement operation to entangle each of the photon in sequence
S with prepared ancilla photons to escape the first detection of
the HLLZ protocol, (ii) to use the inverse entanglement opera-
tion to separate the entangled states back to separable state to
obtain the secret message and to escape the second detection of
the HLLZ protocol. The particular entanglement operation in
the Ref. [1] is CY and we have shown that it fails to extract the
secret message. One may wonder whether Charlie can extract
the secret with other operations instead of CY in this QGWZ-
like attack. In fact, we show below that Charlie will still fail
to extract the secret even if he can apply other entanglement
operations in the QGWZ-like attacks. Without loss of general-
ity, suppose the photon j in the S sequence sent out by the last
agent, Zach, is in the state
|χ〉S j = cos θ j|0〉S j + sin θ j|1〉S j , (3)
where θ j = θB j +θC j + · · ·+θZ j . In this way, Charlie may prepare
his ancilla qubits sequence A each in the state |ε〉A j , and apply a
particular kind of entanglement operation ˆE on |χ〉S j such that
ˆE(|ε〉A j ⊗ |χ〉S j ) = α|ε〉A j |χ〉S j + β|ε⊥〉A j [ ˆU(θ′)|χ〉]S j , (4)
where |α|2 + |β|2 = 1 and 〈ε|ε⊥〉A j = 0, and U(θ′) is the rotation
operation along the y axis defined in (1). After these opera-
tions, Charlie sends sequence S to Alice, and he may escape
from Alice’s first detection by telling the value of his rotation
angle of either θc or (θc + θ′). That is, when Alice selects the
photon j to check the security of the quantum channel used,
Charlie can first measure the corresponding ancilla qubit A j in
the {|ε〉, |ε⊥〉} basis. He then announces his rotation angle of ei-
ther θc or (θc + θ′) when the measured result is in |ε〉 or in |ε⊥〉,
respectively. As a result, Alice will not discover Charlie’s dis-
honest action during her first detection step. From this point of
view, the QGWZ attack of Ref. [1] is just a simplified special
case of above description where Charlie’s ˆE is the controlled-
controlled-(−iσy) operation and the rotated phase shift angle θ′
in Eq. (4) is − 32pi. In short, Charlie hence can escape from the
first detection in the HLLZ protocol with this QGWZ-like at-
tack.
After that, in the HLLZ protocol, Alice will encode her secret
message bit value on each of the remaining photons in sequence
S with a rotation operation along the y-axis by an angle of 32pi if
the bit value is 1. Otherwise, no operation is performed if the bit
value is 0. This message-encoding operation can be expressed
as
ˆU(3pi/2) = −iσy = |1〉〈0| − |0〉〈1|. (5)
When it is applied to the state of Eq. (4), let us consider the
following transformation.
ˆU(3pi/2)|χ〉S j = cos θ j|1〉S j − sin θ j|0〉S j
= cos(θ j − 32pi)|0〉S j + sin(θ j −
3
2
pi)|1〉S j
= cos θ′j|0〉S j + sin θ
′
j|1〉S j
≡ |χU〉S j , (6)
where θ′j = θ j −
3
2pi. Since ˆU(3pi/2) of Eq. (5) commutes with
ˆU(θ′) in Eq. (4), the resultant state becomes
α|ε〉A j |χ
U〉S j + β|ε
⊥〉A j [ ˆU(θ′)|χU〉]S j (7)
if Alice’s secret message bit value is 1. Otherwise, if Alice’s
secret message bit value is 0, the resultant state remains in the
state of Eq. (4).
After intercepting the transmitted photon again, Charlie will
apply the inverse entanglement operation ˆE−1 to separate the
entanglement between photon A j and S j in the QGWZ-like at-
tack. He then will try to figure out Alice’s secret message by
making an measurement on his ancilla qubits in the orthonor-
mal basis of {|ε〉, |ε⊥〉}. Since ˆE−1 ˆE = I, if Charlie applies the
operator ˆE−1 to Eq. (4), the state of the photons A j and S j will
become
ˆE−1(α|ε〉A j |χ〉S j + β|ε⊥〉A j [ ˆU(θ′)|χ〉]S j) = |ε〉A j ⊗ |χ〉S j . (8)
It follows that if the operator ˆE−1 is applied to Eq. (7), it will
become
ˆE−1(α|ε〉A j |χU〉S j + β|ε⊥〉A j [ ˆU(θ′)|χU〉]S j ) = |ε〉A j ⊗ |χU〉S j . (9)
Since the photon state |ε〉A j is the same in both Eq. (8) and
Eq. (9), it is obvious that Charlie cannot distinguish whether
the state of photon S j has been rotated by an angle of 32pi or not
from the measurement result of the ancilla photons A j. Thus
Charlie cannot extract the transmitted secret bits even if he
can apply the entanglement operations defined in Eq. (4) in the
QGWZ-like attacks.
In summary, the QGWZ attack as well as the QGWZ-like
attacks which apply entangled operations other than the CY op-
eration fail to obtain the transmitted secret message bits of the
HLLZ protocol.
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